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Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 proved that many affected countries did not have 
effective insolvency laws at that moment. The increase of companies’ insolvencies 
made it clear that reforms needed to be urgently proposed to amend the inaccurate 
proceedings. However, not all of the commenced insolvency reforms ended up 
having the impact upon debtors and creditors that it was intended. The purpose of 
this paper is thus to prove whether said reforms had a meaningful effect in a group 
of selected countries upon creditors. I provide a general overview of the insolvency 
laws for Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil and describe some insolvency 
reforms that have come into force there recently. The paper then proceeds to the 
empirical analysis of companies’ data, where descriptive but mostly inferential 
statistics are implemented, to examine whether investors changed their lending 
behaviour after the reforms’ commencement. The Chow test and the Difference-
in-difference estimation combined with a matching approach are two techniques 
used to give an answer to this question. The results show that Brazil is the only 
country where the commencement of the insolvency refom had a true impact upon 
leverage. Because the Brazilian insolvency law of study is thought to be a creditor-
friendly reform, at least in some aspects, we observe that these results support the 
perspective that stronger creditor rights cause a decrease of financial leverage, 
also called demand-side view. Stronger creditor rights imply a higher chance that 
the companies’ management will lose jobs and control in case of bankruptcy and 
thus the management feels reticent to rely on external financing.    
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1 Introduction 
 
Insolvency law is a human invention that has been created to dissolve 
unviable businesses and give viable ones a second chance to reorganize and keep 
operating.1 The viability of a business is measured by its long-term survival and its 
ability to sustain profits over a period of time.2 If a business is considered to be 
unviable because it is unable to pay its debt when it falls due, then said business 
can also be referred as an insolvent business.3 The entrepreneur, who brought the 
business idea into the market and now has to deal with his company in an insolvent 
state, will see his self-confidence as a professional lowered, especially if the 
business cannot be back on track and has to close doors. Entrepreneurs with the 
experience of a failed company behind them in a country where insolvency 
regulations do not work well, for instance, will be scared to try again and held back 
from starting a new business when the opportunity arises. The same entrepreneur, 
but on the contrary living in a country with an effective insolvency law, will see 
herself better protected and encouraged to start her own firm, which in the end 
incentives economic growth and dynamism. It then makes sense to expect that 
companies are much more likely to be built up if bankruptcy4 proceedings are less 
costly in case of default. Although it is important to close an unviable business with 
efficient exit frameworks, being able to keep a viable business alive results in a 
much more gratifying outcome: employees hold onto their jobs, the supplier and 
customer networks are maintained and creditors get back a larger amount of their 
credit.5 Therefore, an effective insolvency law aims at not only protecting 
entrepreneurs and business owners, but also supports the rest of the stakeholders 
and especially creditors in recovering as much of their loans as possible.  
But as important as it can be, insolvency law is not a new invention. 
Insolvency law is believed to date back to times of the Roman Empire, where the 
debtor would suffer severe physical damage or have to sell his wife and children 
to slavery if he could not pay his creditors back. Fortunately, insolvency law 
evolved to a point where the debtor’s property and not the persons themselves 
was the asset to pay out the credit. It was then that state authorities came into the 
field to regulate the procedure, and thus the modern insolvency law, although 
keeping concepts formulated by the Romans, was born. However, according to 
                                               
1 See Kappler (2011), p. 1. 
2 See The Balance (2017). 
3 See Investopedia (2016). 
4 The terms “insolvency” and “bankruptcy” are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
5 See Kappler (2011), p. 1. 
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Pagano6, insolvency law did not exist strictly speaking in the ancient cultures, since 
insolvency law is only understood with the appearance of regulatory public 
authorities. 
Nowadays, insolvency laws are not only in a state of flux, but also vary 
around the globe. Proof of this constant change is the amount of reforms that have 
commenced in a huge number of different economies in the recent years. The 2008 
financial crisis and the following huge number of corporate bankruptcies showed a 
great need of effective insolvency frameworks.7 Insolvency reforms have the 
ultimate purpose of strengthening the economic activity of a country by making 
insolvency procedures quicker and cheaper. Apart from changing over time, 
insolvency laws differ across countries and cultures as well. Different economies 
have different insolvency laws, which originate mainly from two major legal 
systems or traditions: civil law tradition and common law tradition. Civil law tradition 
is the most widely distributed around the world and is composed by three families 
of law: French, German and Scandinavian. Common law tradition, in turn, is in 
practice in English-speaking countries like Canada, USA, Australia, India and most 
of the UK.8 La Porta et al.9 have studied the relation between Law and Finance, 
coming up with very interesting results. They report that legal origin and the quality 
of law enforcement matter when talking about shareholder and creditor rights, both 
based on different variables. Regarding legal origin, common-law countries offer 
shareholders and creditors stronger legal protection, whereas French-civil-law 
countries offer the weakest. German-civil-law countries would be somewhere in 
the middle, although closer to the latter. It is not normally the case that some legal 
families protect shareholders and others protect creditors. Regarding law 
enforcement, results also show that legal families with laws protecting investors 
also have stronger law enforcement. For instance, investors in French-Civil-law 
countries have poor protection by the laws and the system enforcing them. Another 
find is that the level of GDP apparently has an impact on the quality of enforcement, 
having richer countries a better system to enforce law.10  
The main goal of this Master Thesis is to provide evidence whether 
insolvency reforms commenced in any of the following four countries: Germany, 
Spain, Brazil and Portugal, had a real impact on firms and thus changed the 
lending behavior of their investors. In order to do that, I will first do a research on 
the Insolvency Law present in said four countries, and then look at the insolvency 
                                               
6 See Pagano (1889), p. 9. cited in Vėlvys/Mikuckienė (2009), pp. 287-288. 
7 See Kappler (2011), p. 1. 
8 See La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1117-1119. 
9 Ibid., pp. 1129, 1138-1139. 
10 Ibid., p. 1141. 
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reforms that have commenced there recently. Once a single reform has been 
picked for each country, the next step is to analyze, by means of a statistical 
program such as Stata, if the investors’ lending behavior have experienced a 
change by looking at the change of leverage between the pre-reform and post-
reform period. 
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2 Insolvency Law 
 
This section focuses on different important aspects of insolvency law of four 
countries: Germany, Spain, Portugal and Brazil. The whole point is to provide a 
general view and understanding of each insolvency law, so only the basic and most 
important points are described below.11 
 
2.1. Germany 
 
The German Insolvency Code entered into force on 1 January 1999. It 
replaced the Bankruptcy Code of 1877 and was amended later in 2012 by the so-
called “Reform Act”.12 
There are several tools used in pre-insolvency restructuring and 
undertaken by shareholders and creditors to avoid insolvency.13 A debt-to-equity 
swap is one of those. With this transaction, the obligations or debts of the company 
are exchanged for something of value, equity. A debt-to-equity swap is especially 
appealing to creditors if the company is going through a momentary rough patch 
but still has long-term potential. Other tools used to prevent insolvency are inputs 
of shareholders’ capital, although these are unlikely to be recovered in case the 
debtor files for insolvency.  
The debtor is only legally obliged to file for insolvency proceedings in case 
of illiquidity or over-indebtedness and have a maximum period of three weeks to 
do so. If the petition is not filed in time, the management could be subject to 
personal liability. In case of impending illiquidity, however, the debtor is not obliged 
to file a petition for insolvency proceedings.14 
Either the insolvent debtor or any creditor can file a petition for insolvency 
proceedings. The reason of the insolvency petition has to be illiquidity (unable to 
meet at least 90% of due payments liabilities within a three-week period), 
impending illiquidity (likely to become unable to meet its future payments when 
they fall due) and/or over-indebtedness (the total amount of liabilities exceeds the 
total amount of assets). If the debtor is the petitioner, any of said reasons is valid 
to commence the insolvency proceedings. However, if the creditor wants to file the 
petition, he or she can only base the petition on illiquidity or over-indebtedness.15 
                                               
11 As the intention of this chapter is to provide a summary of different insolvency laws, all text is 
taken from external sources. However, it is properly cited and paraphrased as much as possible. 
12 Clifford Chance (2015), p. 95. 
13 Baker McKenzie (2016), pp. 198f. 
14 Clifford Chance (2015), p. 96. 
15 Baker McKenzie (2016), pp. 192f. 
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The insolvency procedure can be divided in two phases: preliminary 
insolvency proceedings and main insolvency proceedings. The goal of the 
preliminary insolvency proceedings (or interim proceedings), which start straight 
after the petition is filed and last around three months, is to evaluate the current 
financial situation of the debtor and to verify that he fulfills the requirements needed 
to begin with the insolvency proceedings. Said requisites are a valid insolvency 
reason and sufficient assets to cover the procedure costs.16 A preliminary 
insolvency administrator, who at the same time will monitor the actions of the 
debtor and finally submit a report to the insolvency court, leads this task. If the 
abovementioned requisites are met, the court opens main insolvency proceedings. 
Alternatively, a preliminary custodian can be appointed instead if the proceedings 
are run as Debtor-in-Possession Proceedings, in which case he or she has no 
direct control of the debtor’s operations. This procedure, which lets the 
management remain in charge of the business decisions throughout the insolvency 
proceedings, needs to be requested by the debtor and granted by the court. The 
Debtor-in-Possession Proceedings tended to be granted only under exceptional 
circumstances in the past, and there were many management’s complaints about 
losing control over their businesses. However, after the ESUG came into force 
Debtor-in-Possession Proceedings became much more available.17 If the debtor 
files a petition for insolvency proceedings before he is illiquid and also applies for 
Debtor-In-Possession Proceedings, he or she will be given a maximum period of 
three months to elaborate an insolvency plan, called Protective Shield Period. 
During this period, the debtor is granted protection, which prevents enforcement of 
any claims from disturbing the preparation of the insolvency plan.18  
Regarding the main insolvency proceedings (or formal insolvency 
proceedings), the preliminary insolvency administrator/custodian is generally 
appointed by the court to continue its engagement, who is in charge of making sure 
the creditors are as satisfied as possible. According to the report made by the 
insolvency administrator/custodian and subject to the final decision of the creditor’s 
assembly, the debtor can be immediately liquidated or continued for 
reorganization. The most popular option is generally the debtor’s liquidation.19  
The German Insolvency Law recognizes different types of creditors and 
classifies them according to participation in the insolvency proceedings, the extent 
to which their claims are secured and the rank of these claims. 20  
                                               
16 Clifford Chanze (2015), p. 96. 
17 Baker McKenzie (2016), pp. 193-196. 
18 Clifford Chanze (2015), p. 97. 
19 Baker McKenzie (2016), p. 195. 
20 Ibid., pp. 187-189. 
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 Creditors with right of segregation of an asset: right to separate their assets 
from the debtor’s estate. 
 Secured creditors: right of separate satisfaction, which allows such secured 
creditors to claim the proceeds generated on the realization of the collateral 
up to the amount of their secured claim. 
 Estate creditors: satisfied before ordinary insolvency creditors. Estate 
claims are those acquired after the opening of insolvency proceedings and 
are usually paid in full. 
 Insolvency creditors: their claims are unsecured and came into existence 
before the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Such insolvency 
creditors are rarely paid in full, but instead only get a small percentage of 
their claims (insolvency quota) 
 Subordinated creditors: have the lowest priority 
 
According to a report conducted by Noerr and McKinsey & company21, “over 
90 per cent of 220 experts surveyed”, who were insolvency experts such as 
lawyers, judges, insolvency administrators, creditors and investors, ”confirm that 
the reform has made German restructuring law more attractive.” There are 
advantages seen by the experts. First, creditors have now a greater possibility to 
participate in the creditors’ committee, so they are more willing to support the 
restructuring. Second, the restructuring process is now faster thanks to the 
protective shield. Regarding things that could be improved, there is the absence of 
a group insolvency law, which does not recognize insolvency proceedings covering 
groups of companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21 See Noerr (2015) 
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2.2. Spain 
 
The Spanish Insolvency Law (SIL) 22/2003, named Ley Concursal, entered 
into force on 1 September 2004 and has been modified several times by Laws and 
Royal Decrees in the past years. The Insolvency Law regulates all norms 
applicable to the insolvency procedure (concurso), which applies to all persons 
and entities, with exception of Public Administrators.22 
There are two possible pre-insolvency measures: the insolvency 
postponement and the insolvency meditation. The first one opens a three-month 
negotiation period to reach a refinancing agreement (acuerdo de refinanciación) 
or a composition agreement (convenio de acreedores). The second one provides 
out-of-court solutions for small restructuring cases and businesses that not yet 
been declared insolvent. Both alternatives extend the term during which the debtor 
must file for insolvency.23  
A company or an individual is legally obliged to resort to insolvency 
proceedings when they find themselves in a situation of actual insolvency 
(insolvencia actual), or in other words, if they cannot pay their debts as they fall 
due. The debtor may also file for insolvency, but is not obliged to, in case of 
imminent insolvency (insolvencia imminente). The Insolvency Law forces the 
insolvent debtor to file for the insolvency proceedings after maximum two months 
since the date, when he or she became aware, or should have, of the insolvency 
situation. 24 The debtor is entitled to pay all costs that derive from the insolvency 
proceedings, such as the attorneys’ fees or the insolvency administrator’s fees.25 
However, the debtor can opt for the insolvency postponement mentioned 
above, where three additional months are granted to reach an agreement with 
creditors. Only if he or she can prove the initiation of either an out-of-court 
refinancing agreement with financial creditors or an early composition agreement 
(in-court restructuring) with creditors, an extra time period can be given. If of these 
two agreements neither is reached within the three-month period, and the debtor 
is still insolvent, he or she must file for insolvency proceedings within the following 
month.26 This new rule, called the “2+3+1 rule” or “5 bis Moratorium”, gives 
therefore the debtor an extra period of four months of protection to reach an 
agreement, while preventing creditors to enforce actions against necessary assets 
for the on-going of the business or file for necessary insolvency proceedings.27 
                                               
22 Clifford Chance (2015), p. 107. 
23 Baker McKenzie (2016), pp. 384f. 
24 Uría Menéndez (2012), p. 11. 
25 Clifford Chance (2015), pp. 107f. 
26 Uría Menendez (2012), p. 11. 
27 Clifford Chance (2015), p. 108. 
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Either the debtor or the creditor to the Commercial Court of the capital of 
the province in which the debtor has its center of main interest (COMI) can file the 
petition for insolvency proceedings. If the applicants are the directors of the 
company, it is called voluntary insolvency proceedings (concurso voluntario) and 
they must documents such as a description of the company’s current situation, the 
accounting books… The petition together with the supporting documents must be 
submitted to the commercial courts of the capital of province where the COMI of 
the company lies.28 However, if the applicant is any creditor, it is called involuntary 
insolvency proceedings, and he or she must provide evidence of their debt and of 
the insolvency situation (although it can be difficult to prove that the debtor is not 
regularly paying its debts as they fall due). In the latter case, if the application is 
rejected, the creditor may be sued and ordered to pay the corresponding costs and 
fees. In involuntary insolvency proceedings, the debtor is given the chance to 
object the creditors’ petition before any insolvency procedure is opened. 29 
A part from the petitioner criteria, the insolvency proceedings can also be 
classified according to its length into ordinary insolvency proceedings or summary 
insolvency proceedings. The latter ones are applied if the insolvency there are less 
than 50 creditors and the debtor’s liabilities amount to less than 5 million euros. 
The summary insolvency proceedings may also be applied if the debtor submits a 
liquidation plan attached with the insolvency proceedings or if she files a proposal 
for an early composition agreement.30 According to a report from the EAE Business 
School31, around 95% of the insolvency proceedings declared in 2013 in Spain 
were voluntary and 77% of them were summary insolvency proceedings, whose 
costs averaged around 11% of their goods.  
Once the application is filed, the Spanish Commercial Courts declare the 
insolvency state. The time it takes them to do so depends on a number of factors, 
such as who files the petition, if the documentation is complete or not and the 
workload of the courts at that moment. This is on average between two and four 
weeks.32  
After the insolvency declaration (auto-declaración de concurso), the 
insolvency procedure (concurso) is initiated, which consists of two phases. The 
main goal of the first phase, also called common phase, is to appoint the insolvency 
administrator or trustee, to specify what are the assets and liabilities of the 
company and to finally come up with a list of the insolvency creditors and their 
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., pp. 108f. 
30 Uría Menéndez (2012), p. 43. 
31 See EAE Business School (2014) 
32 Clifford Chance (2015), p. 109. 
9 
 
ranked claims within two months of being appointed, or one month in summary 
insolvency proceedings.33 The insolvency administrator, either a lawyer, or an 
economist or auditor is appointed by the insolvency judge and will supervise the 
company’s activities in case of voluntary insolvency proceedings, or take control 
of the company and be in charge of all further decisions in case of involuntary 
insolvency proceedings. Even an auditor company (provided that it has both a 
lawyer and an economist or auditor) can be appointed as insolvency 
administrator.34  For large insolvency cases, auditors, consultancy firms or law 
firms are appointed as insolvency administrators. The administrator’s fees are 
taken from the insolvency estate (debtor’s assets and rights at the moment of the 
insolvency declaration) and depend on the number of creditors and the size of the 
proceedings. Creditors, who are also paid out of the insolvency state, must report 
their claims within one month of the declaration of insolvency.35 It is then when the 
insolvency administrator has enough information to elaborate the abovementioned 
list.  
In the second phase, the debtor can opt for a composition arrangement 
(convenio) with the creditors or the liquidation of his assets.36 If after the common 
phase the debtor has not requested liquidation, the court will go for the composition 
agreement. For this purpose, a creditors’ meeting (junta de acreedores) is 
scheduled and proposals of payment reduction, payment delay or both in the 
presence of the insolvency administrator and the judge take place. Actually, there 
are two types of composition agreements: early composition agreement and 
ordinary composition agreement.37 To file for the first one, the debtor needs the 
support of creditors representing at least 20% of the overall amount of claims. 
There is not much time to do so between the insolvency petition and the deadline 
for the creditors’ claims report, as result of which no many early composition 
agreements are submitted. The creditors can also file the ordinary composition 
agreement, unlike the abovementioned agreement. If no proposal is approved or 
the debtor fails to comply with the composition agreement in force, the court will 
start the liquidation.  
The liquidation is based on the cease of the management from directors. 
Either the debtor or the creditors can also request the liquidation at any time during 
the insolvency proceedings, and a liquidation plan’s submission is allowed already 
at the very beginning with the insolvency petition. The selected insolvency 
                                               
33 Uría Menéndez (2012), pp. 23f. 
34 Ibid., p. 17. 
35 Ibid., p. 22. 
36 Ibid., p. 13. 
37 Ibid., p. 35. 
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administrator is in charge now of selling the debtor’s assets and the money is 
distributed among creditors according to priority rules.38 The liquidation plan 
foresees direct transfer of the debtor’s assets when possible or otherwise these 
will be sold in an auction. 
There are two main groups of creditors: insolvency creditors (acreedores 
concursales) and creditors of the insolvency state (acreedores de la masa). The 
the claims against the insolvency state, such as the fees for filing for insolvency 
and fees incurred by the insolvency administrator, must be paid from the 
insolvency state as they fall due and before the insolvency state distribution to the 
insolvency creditors starts.39 As mentioned above, the insolvency administrator 
needs to prepare a list of the insolvency creditors’ claims in the common phase. 
These can be classified into:40 
 Privileged claims: can be either generally prioritized (salaries, tax claims…) 
or specially prioritized (mortgages). The specially prioritized creditors are 
not subject to the composition arrangement and the first to be paid in case 
of liquidation. The value of the special credit rights must be 90 % of the so-
called “reasonable value”. 
 Ordinary claims (suppliers) 
 Subordinated claims: those paid last (fines, sanctions) 
 
If the debtor comes to an agreement in the previous two years of the 
declaration of insolvency and the insolvency administrator can prove that it was 
“detrimental to the insolvency estate”, the judge can withdraw such agreement. 
This may arise even in the absence of fraudulent intent. The decision of whether 
an action or agreement was detrimental depends on each case. In order for a 
refinancing agreement, understood as such increasing the borrower’s funds or 
extending the maturity date of a previous financing agreement, to be immune to a 
claw-back action, it must meet several requirements.41 
The cram-down mechanism implies that, in the event that qualified 
majorities vote in favor of the refinancing agreements mentioned above, its effects 
may also be imposed on dissenting or absent creditors. Therefore, dissident 
creditors who vote against a pre-insolvency refinancing agreement or do not vote 
at all, may be crammed down. This cramming down measures provided by 
refinancing agreements are extended also for creditors’ arrangements. The 
purpose of these measures remains similar: creditors’ arrangements should not be 
                                               
38 Uría Menéndey (2012), p. 40. 
39 Ibid., p. 22. 
40 Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
41 Uría Menéndez (2012), pp. 29-31. 
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unfeasible only because a few minority voted for it. 42 
Either if directors fail to file for insolvency proceedings within the 
abovementioned two-month period or there has been a possible misconduct or 
gross negligence from directors that caused or contributed to the company’s 
insolvency (concurso culpable), the management would be considered liable to 
pay any debts that cannot settled with the liquidation of the debtor’s assets.43 It is 
when the declaration of insolvency takes place that an examination of the causes 
is initiated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 See Ruiz (2015), p. 26. 
43 Uría Menéndez (2012), p. 41. 
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2.3. Portugal 
 
The Portuguese Insolvency Law, called Código da Involsvência e 
Recuperação de Empresas,  was amended for the last time by Decree-law No. 
26/2015, which entered into force on 3 March 2015.44 
There are two pre-insolvency procedures: PER (Proceso Especial de 
Revitalização, court-monitored) and the SIREVE (Sistema de Recuperação por 
Via Extrajudicial, out-of-court). Both procedures aim at enabling companies in 
difficulty to restructure at an early stage and preventing their insolvency through 
an agreement between the company and its creditors. The main difference 
between them is that the PER involves judicial intervention, while the SIREVE is 
out-of-court.45  
The PER allows the debtor with economic difficulties or imminently 
insolvent to enter negotiations and arrange a restructuring plan, which is mainly 
prepared by the debtor and has to be devised in maximum period of three months, 
under the supervision of an administrator appointed by the court. The PER aims at 
the recovery of the debtor without starting an insolvency procedure, which would 
require the declaration by the court of the debtor’s insolvency and would lead to a 
greater time consumption. The judicial administrator is in charge of preparing a list 
of all creditors involved and their claims, who are invited to file them and participate 
in the negotiations of the agreements.46 
The SIREVE grants creditors and companies going through a rough 
financial patch or in an imminent or current insolvency situation the possibility of 
an extrajudicial agreement, which aims at the recovery of said companies. These 
negotiations should be concluded within a period of three months, which may be 
extended for an additional one more month. If the settlement is accepted by at 
least 2/3 of total amount of credit, the recovery plan may be submitted before the 
court47. The goal of this procedure is to speed up the negotiation process with the 
main creditors of the companies in order to guarantee the improvement of their 
working conditions, assuming IAPMEI (Agency for Competitiveness and 
Innovation) the mediator role, being then not monitored by the courts, and driving 
force in the whole process. The SIREVE is available to companies which are still 
viable and does not involve the court nor requires to change the company's 
management. The intervention of a judicial administrator is not needed either.48 
                                               
44 See Serra (2015) 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Cuatrecasas, Gonçalves Pereira (2016), pp. 89f. 
47 See Cuatrecasas, Gonçalves Pereira (2016), p. 88. 
48 See AERLIS  
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Since the moment on which a company becomes aware of its insolvency 
or should become aware, the company has 30 days to file for insolvency. Apart 
from the debtor, the creditor can also file a petition for insolvency proceedings 
(involuntary), but in this case the attached documents providing information about 
the insolvency state and the creditors’ claims are needed. The debtor then has 10 
days to object to the creditor’s petition. Once the petition is filed, the court may 
appoint an interim administrator to provide the company’s management with 
support49 
If the petition is accepted by the court, it will open the insolvency procedure. 
An insolvency administrator is appointed and a deadline for the creditors to file 
their claims and a creditors’ general meeting is set. The insolvency administrator 
prepares a list of all the claims, which needs to be presented after 15 days of the 
abovementioned deadline. If there are no objections made by the creditors with 
respect to the list, the court makes a decision about the credit delivery and 
priority.50 If no insolvency plan is submitted or approved within the following 60 
days of the first creditors’ general meeting, the insolvency administrator must go 
on with the liquidation. According to the Portuguese Law, there are four different 
types of creditors51: 
- Secured creditors: those with security over assets seized up to the 
value of such assets (banks) 
- Preferential creditors: those with a right to be preferentially paid up to 
the value of the assets (employees) 
- Non-secured creditors: those who do not obtain assets as collateral 
(suppliers, customers…) 
- Subordinated creditors: those paid only after the non-secured creditors 
have been paid in full 
The credits incurred during the insolvency procedure (court fees and 
insolvency administrator’s remuneration) have the highest priority. 
The average time of an insolvency proceeding is not easily determinable, because 
it will vary depending on several factors, such as the number of creditors, passive 
volume, the composition of the insolvent estate and the presentation of objections 
to the list of credits recognized by the insolvency administrator, amongst other 
variables. On average it could take from two to nine years for the most complex 
cases. 
 
                                               
49 Law Business Research Ltd review (2014), pp. 364f. 
50 Ibid., pp. 365f. 
51 Ibid, p. 367. 
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2.4. Brazil 
 
The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, named Nova Lei de Falências e 
Recuperação de Empresas Law No. 11.101/05, replaced in 2005 the previous 
bankruptcy law, which had governed insolvency proceedings for 60 years. 
According to Colombo and Braga52, the insolvency law ultimately changed “from a 
liquidation-oriented and outdated legislation to embrace modern principles of 
corporate restructuring designed to rescue distressed but viable businesses.” 
The new system offers three alternatives in case of insolvency: judicial 
reorganization, extrajudicial reorganization and bankruptcy (liquidation). The main 
difference between the first two procedures is that judicial reorganization is a court-
supervised reorganization proceeding, while extrajudicial reorganization means 
out-of-court reorganization. Different sets of conditions and requirements have to 
be met for triggering each of these procedures. 53 
The main goal of judicial reorganization is to provide means to overcome 
financial troubles so that the productive business can keep going. Judicial 
reorganization is the most common insolvency mechanism for companies in Brazil 
and its petition, as well as the petition for extrajudicial reorganization, can only be 
commenced by the debtor. The development of the recovery plan is coordinated 
by the insolvency administrator, who is appointed by the court. In this case, the 
management keeps the control of the business with the assistance of the 
insolvency administrator and the supervision of a creditors’ committee. The judicial 
reorganization proceeding may last for approximately two years and in the first 180 
days following the legal recovery announcement, the creditor is forbidden to sell 
“productive capital goods” essential to the operations of the company. With regard 
to the abovementioned recovery plan, it must contain: what restructuring 
mechanisms to be used (debt rescheduling, corporate reorganization, partial sell 
of assets, shutdown of loss-making units, capital increases…), proof of economic 
viability of the company and a document of the debtor’s assets. The recovery plan 
must be accepted by the four categories forming the creditors’ committee: labour 
creditors, secured creditors, unsecured creditors and small companies.54 
The extrajudicial restructuring plan is prepared by the financially distressed 
company to obtain more favorable terms and conditions for the payment of debts. 
This plan needs to be discussed between the debtor and the creditors. This 
                                               
52 See Colombo/Braga (2016), p.11. 
53 See Rapisardi/Zujkewoski (2014) 
54 Baker Mckenzie (2016), pp. 73f. 
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proceeding can be commenced by the financially distressed company and the 
management can stay in control of the business.55 
The aim of the bankruptcy is to sell the assets, preferably as a whole or in 
blocks, and use the money obtained to pay the creditors, which has a higher risk 
of diminished returns than if the debtor is restructured, especially for low-priority 
creditors. Unlike the other two abovementioned proceedings, bankruptcy can be 
filed by either the insolvent debtor or any creditor. In this case, the management is 
not allowed to stay in charge of the company anymore and the court judge appoints 
an administrator for that matter. In case of Bankruptcy, the company has the right 
to question the nature of the bankruptcy request within a 10-day period. The 
liquidation of assets must be made according to the following preferential order: 
- Labor claims 
- Secured claims 
- Tax claims 
- Privileged claims 
- Unsecured claims 
- Subordinated claims  
Most of the bankruptcy cases in Brazil are filed by the creditor because of, among 
other reasons, the non-existing obligation to file for self-liquidation, the loss of 
control over the business and the bad reputation that may arise.56  
 
 
                                               
55 Ibid., pp. 71f. 
56 Ibid.  
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3 Insolvency reforms 
 
In Section 3, tables regarding some insolvency reforms that have been 
commenced in the previous years can be found for each of the four countries of 
study. The goals and some important changes made to the insolvency law are 
described for each reform of the table. For the analysis in Chapter 4, and especially 
for the Chow test and Difference-in-Difference Estimation, I have chosen the 
following reforms:  
- Germany: Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von 
Unternehmen (ESUG) of 2012 
- Spain: Law 38/2011  
- Portugal: Law 16/2012  
- Brazil: Law 11101/05 
 
Regarding the event date, two options are taken into account. First, the 
whole analysis is conducted for the case where the event date is considered to be 
the commencement date. The Difference-in-Difference approach, the most 
important and revealing part of the analysis, is then also repeated for the case 
where the event date is supposed to be one year prior to the reform 
commencement. The reason why I want to take this possibility into account is that 
in some countries the insolvency reform passed on a year prior to its 
commencement and it is sometimes the case that some aspects of the reform 
come into force right after the publication.  
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Table 1. Summary of the Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (ESUG).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57 See Höher (2012), pp. 18f. 
Country Year Name Passed on In effect 
since 
Overarching goal Changes to old law Impact on 
Stakeholder 
Rights 
Germany57 2012 Gesetz zur I 
iteren 
Erleichterung 
der Sanierung 
von 
Unternehmen 
(ESUG)  
 
07.12.2011 01.03.2012 - To improve the position of 
creditors in insolvency 
proceedings over the assets 
of German companies 
(granting more power and 
influence to the creditors) 
 
- Enhance the legal 
framework for Debt-in-
possession proceedings 
- Introduction of Protection Shield 
Period (three-month period granted to 
the debtor to work on the insolvency 
plan) 
 
- Introduction of preliminary creditors' 
committee with wide powers 
(creditors have now a greater 
influence on the selection of the 
insolvency administrator) 
 
- Allowance of debt-equity swaps 
(claims by creditors may also be 
converted to share or membership 
rights in the corporate debtor) 
 
- Easier access to Debt-In-
Possession Proceedings (the debtor 
remains in charge of the company's 
decisions) 
Creditor-
friendly 
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Table 2. Summary of Law 38/2011. 
 
                                               
58 Banco de España (2016), pp. 13-15.  
Country Year Name Passed on In effect 
since 
Overarching goal Changes to old law Impact on 
Stakeholder 
Rights 
Spain58 2011 
 
Law 38/2011 or 
“The 
Amendment” 
 
10.10.2011 
 
 
01.01.2012 
 
- To improve the pre-
insolvency period by 
receving judicial approval of 
a refinancing agreement 
 
- To anticipate the outcome 
and thus speed-up 
insolvency proceedings 
 
- To reinforce the role and 
responsibility of insolvency 
trustees 
 
- To facilitate the out-of-court 
restructuring for companies 
undergoing financial 
difficulties 
 
- The debtor no longer needs to be 
in a state of actual insolvency to be 
able to file the notice with the court 
(allows debtors to anticipate the 
whole process) 
 
- One unique insolvency 
administrator (before that: three 
insolvency trustees: lawyer, 
auditor/economist and unsecured 
creditors) 
 
- Liquidation by the administrator in 
case of business inactivity 
 
- Legal persons can become 
insolvency administrators 
 
- Sets different requirements for 
refinancing agreements 
 
Not defined 
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Table 3. Summary of Law 16/2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
59 Campos Ferreira Sá Carneiro & Associados (2012), pp. 1, 5f. 
Country Year Name Passed on In effect 
since 
Overarching goal Changes to old law Impact on 
Stakeholder 
Rights 
Portugal59 2012 
 
Law 16/2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20.04.2012 
 
20.05.2012 
 
- To allow companies in 
financial distress to initiate 
recovery and debt relief 
negotiations with their 
creditors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
- Amendment of the CIRE and 
establishment of the PER 
 
- Reduction of many procedures 
time limits (petition must be filed 
within 30 days, not 60 days) 
 
- Reinforcement of the rules 
regarding the liability of the 
persons affected by the court 
decision of insolvency 
 
- Better definition of insolvency 
administrator's role and 
responsibilities  
 
 
Creditor-
friendly 
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Table 4. Summary of Law 11101/05. 
                                               
60 See Funchal et al. (2008), p. 250. 
Country Year Name Passed on In effect 
since 
Overarching goal Changes to old law Impact on 
Stakeholder 
Rights 
Brazil60 2005 
 
Law 11101/05 or 
Nova Lei de Falências 
e Recuperação de 
Empresas  
 
 
 
 
09.02.2005 
 
 
 
09.06.2005 
 
 
 
- To increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency 
of judicial reorganization 
and liquidation proceedings 
in Brazil 
 
- To enable companies to 
negotiate restructuring 
plans directly with creditors, 
allowing them to participate 
more actively 
 
 
 
- Creation of two new legal 
proceedings: Judicial Reorganisation 
and Extrajudicial Reorganisation 
 
- Creditors now play a more important 
role in reorganization 
 
- Debtors are given a 180-day stay 
 
- Secured credit is given priority over 
tax credit 
 
- Credits extended during the 
reorganisation are given first priority in 
liquidation 
Creditor-
friendly 
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4 Empirical research 
 
In this section, an empirical research on the most important reforms 
commenced in each country will be done. The goal of this part is to conduct an 
analysis of financial data around the reform date and see if there is statistically 
significant difference in leverage before and after said reform to be able to affirm 
that there has been a change in the investors’ lending behavior.  
 
4.1. Data collection 
 
The financial data collected for the mentioned analysis comes from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream database, and it is entirely manipulated by means 
of the statistical program Stata/IC 13.1. It is data belonging to the most important 
companies in each country. In the case of Germany, for instance, the companies 
are the ones listed in DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX stock indices, or in the case 
of Spain, the ones listed in the IBEX35 stock index, including medium and small 
capitalization firms.  
The parameter that I am most interested about is leverage, measured as 
the debt to total assets ratio. The change of a company’s leverage reflects the 
change of the investor’s lending behavior, in the sense of these being more or less 
willing to lend companies money. The relation between leverage and creditor 
rights, which are supposed to be fostered by impactful creditor-friendly insolvency 
reforms, have two different interpretations. For instance, if an insolvency reform is 
believed to be creditor-friendly, we would expect that once the reform has 
commenced, creditors tend to lend more money, since they would feel better 
protected. Because of stronger creditors’ rights, the likelihood of payback would 
increase, which in turn would mean that creditors would face less risk and lower 
returns. As La Porta et al. state61, “to the extent that better legal protections enable 
the financiers to offer entrepreneurs money at better terms, we predict that the 
countries with better legal protections should have more external finance”. 
However, there is another position regarding the link between creditor rights and 
company leverage. It might be the case that, because of creditors have stronger 
rights, the company’s management feels reticent about increasing corporate 
leverage so they do not lose control in case of financial distress. This view is 
supported by Rajan and Zingales62, who report that “[strong creditor protection] 
                                               
61 La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1132. cited in El Gohul et al. (2011), p. 3. 
62 Rajan/Zingales (1995), p.1444. cited in El Gohul et al. (2011), p. 3. 
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commits creditor to penalizing management (and equity holders) if the firm gets 
into financial distress, thus giving management strong incentives to stay clear of 
it.” The study of El Gohul et al.63 reports how creditor rights link to corporate 
leverage, although it does not take into account bankruptcy reforms in the sample 
period and thus suppose a stable creditor rights index over time. Djankov et al.64, 
on the contrary, consider bankruptcy reforms in their research, but they study how 
said reforms affect the size of private credit markets of countries and not corporate 
leverage. 
The data for the analysis will not only be composed by only companies and 
leverage values, but also by the correspondent other variables that might explain 
the leverage behavior, as it is mentioned later in Section 4.2.3. Leverage is the 
dependent variable (DV), while the explanatory variables are the independent 
variables (IV).  Our data is a combination of cross-sectional data and time series 
data, in the sense of being made up of numerous companies across time. Said 
data can have two different structures: panel data set or independently pooled 
cross section. In our case I rely on panel data sets, since data is collected for the 
same individuals across time. In contrast, independently pooled cross section 
shows data gathered randomly from a large population instead.65 It is obvious that 
the size of the panel data set is going to differ across countries, since not all of 
them will have the same number of public companies.  
Once the panel data set is properly constructed, I need to exclude financial 
institutions from our analysis, because, as stated by Fama and French66, “the high 
leverage that is normal for these firms probably does not have the same meaning 
as for nonfinancial firms, where high leverage more likely indicates distress”. To 
account for this, I only consider firms whose SIC Code lie outside the range 6000-
6999. In addition, I limit the extreme values of all variables to the 1 and 99 
percentile to prevent outliers from misleading our study. This process, known as 
winsorization, does not have to be confused with trimming, since the latter is simply 
cutting off data, which would imply a loss of information.67 
 
4.2. Data overview 
 
The first three steps of the analysis are meant to give a general impression 
of our data and expound how leverage relates to its explanatory variables. For 
                                               
63 See Djankov et al. (2007), pp. 318-323 cited in El Gohul et al. (2011), p. 2. 
64 See El Gohul et al. (2011), pp. 19f.  
65 See Wooldridge (2013), pp. 432f. 
66 Fama/French (1992), p. 429. 
67 See Myles (2015) 
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this purpose, descriptive statistics, hypothesis tests, and regression models are 
used. 
 
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The first step of the data analysis is to compute the descriptive statistics of 
the winsorized leverage. This is clearly supposed to provide only a first idea of the 
data I have and its principal characteristics in a summarized form. However, 
descriptive statistics may not be used to draw conclusions about the population 
that the data sample represents.68 Therefore, I cannot to tell if there is a significant 
difference in leverage between the period before and after the reform date by just 
looking at the descriptive statistics. To be able to reach conclusions that extend 
the immediate data alone one needs to rely on inferential statistics. 
 
4.2.2. Two-sample t test with unequal variance 
 
The second step of the data analysis is thus conducting a two-sample t test 
with unequal variances to check whether leverage is statistically different or not 
between both pre-reform and post-reform periods. Actually, comparing the means 
of two groups is one of the simplest applications of inference statistics.69 The 
corresponding null and alternative hypothesis of the test are shown below: 
 
𝐻0: 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 
𝐻𝑎: 𝜇1 ≠ 𝜇2 
(1) 
 
 where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are the population leverage means of the period before 
and after the reform, respectively.  
Since our interest lies in the immediate surroundings of the reform date, I 
cannot consider a huge year range in our analysis. Taking into account years quite 
distant from the event would provide misleading results, because the means would 
be easily altered by observations far away from the reform year. Nonetheless, the 
two-sample t test cannot declare firmly that there has been an actual change of 
tendency regarding leverage after the reform, which in fact is the main purpose of 
our analysis. As mentioned previously, the t test can only tell a difference in means 
instead, and thus further analysis will be necessary. 
 
                                               
68 See Laerd Statistics (2013) 
69 See Minitab 17 Support (2016) 
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4.2.3. Multiple linear regression model 
 
The third step is multiple linear regression analysis. Although regression 
analysis provides an idea of the relationship among variables of our data, it does 
not yet give us a direct answer to our question of leverage change at first glance. 
However, it is worth introducing this concept here, since it is later used for the 
Chow test in Section 4.3.1. The reason why I use a multiple linear regression model 
(or multiple regression model) instead of a single linear regression model between 
leverage and time is that other explanatory variables of leverage that might have 
an effect on it can be taken out of the error term and be put explicitly in the 
equation.70 According to Rajan and Zingales71, these independent variables are 
the company sales, the market to book value, the return on assets and the 
tangibility of assets (ratio of fixed to total assets). Sales act as a proxy for firm size, 
market to book value for growth opportunities and return on assets is used as a 
proxy for business profitability. It is also important not to forget any of the 
mentioned relevant variables, because otherwise I would be wrongly giving 
inappropriate explanatory power to the rest of the variables (omitted variable bias). 
This bias appears in the estimators of the variables’ parameters of the regression 
model, meaning that they would differ from their correspondent population value 
even if the omitted variable is not correlated with all variables in the model.72 The 
mentioned multiple regression model can be estimated using different methods, 
and it depends on the assumptions regarding our data which one to choose. The 
one used in this paper, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method, 
calculates the estimates to minimize the sum of squared residuals. 73 
Previous to a further analysis of our data, it is important to have a quick 
look at it, see how it behaves and what are some important commands in Stata 
that need to be taken into account in this preliminary stage if I want the regression 
results to be reliable. Regression models are fit to panel data using the OLS 
estimation method to calculate the several coefficients using the xtreg command 
in Stata.74 In order for the OLS estimation method to not only provide unbiased 
estimators, but also with the smallest variance, the Gauss-Markov Theorem needs 
to apply. Only then our OLS estimators will be Best Linear Unbiased Estimators 
(BLUEs).75 
 
                                               
70 See Wooldridge (2013), p. 65. 
71 See Rajan/Zingales (1995) pp. 1451f. 
72 See Wooldridge (2013), pp. 84-88. 
73 Ibid., pp. 28f. 
74 See StataCorp. (2013), pp. 359-364. 
75 See Wooldridge (2013), p. 98. 
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4.2.4. Individual and Time fixed-effects 
 
Because of the nature of our data, each company has its own internal 
characteristics (unobserved individual fixed-effects/unobserved company-level 
heterogeneity), which may or may not influence the independent variables and be 
determinant of leverage. So when I use the fixed-effects (FE) estimator, a method 
for eliminating the unobserved fixed effect along with any time-constant 
explanatory variable, I control for omitted variables that vary across companies but 
are constant over time (ex.: some companies might belong to a different industry, 
and different industries might have different leverage policies). In other words, I 
control for the impact or bias that the characteristics of the panel variable, in our 
case the company, have on the dependent or independent variables.76 The FE 
model ultimately removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics so the 
real effect of the predictors on the outcome variable can be properly assessed. To 
employ this fixed-effects linear model, Stata uses the xtreg, fe77 command. 
Another way to do so is by manually including “i.company” in our regression, as 
we will see with the time-fixed effects.78 The OLS method is applied to estimate 
this regression model, although it can estimate many more regression models. 
In addition, apart from company-related characteristics, characteristics 
present in the years of study (unobserved year-level heterogeneity) might also 
exist. To control in Stata for those omitted variables that are constant across 
companies but vary over time (ex.: in some years, increasing/decreasing leverage 
was more popular for some reason and firms tended to do that), I must include 
time dummies in each regression by typing “i.year”. The reason why I must use 
this way to proceed is that Stata does not have a command to fit two-way FE 
models.79 With time fixed-effects, however, no time trend is perceived. Including 
time dummies for each year allows the model to attribute some of the variation in 
the data to unobserved events that took place each year or otherwise 
characteristics of that year. In other words, if I omitted the year dummies, an 
increase or decrease in leverage would only be attributed to the other explanatory 
variables.  
 
 
                                               
76 See Torres-Reyna (2007), p. 9. 
77 See StataCorp. (2013), pp. 359-364. 
78 See Torres-Reyna (2007), p. 18. 
79 See Baum (2006), p. 224. 
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4.2.5. Heteroscedasticity 
 
Because I are using the OLS method to come up with the variables’ 
coefficients of the regression, it is important to check first for heteroscedasticity in 
our data. After running the command which tests for it, called xttest380, I 
conclude that, indeed, heteroscedasticity exists and thus the variance of our error 
term is not constant over the whole range of the independent variables, at least for 
one of them. The problem with heteroscedasticity is that OLS does not provide the 
estimators with the smallest variance, becoming the regression not as much 
efficient as it could be.81 The coefficients, also known as estimators, remain 
unbiased, although their variances do not. This, in turn, implies unreliable 
hypothesis tests. To correct for heteroscedasticity I use the vce(cluster id) 
option in Stata.82 I cluster our data in cross-sectional units (company groups) 
because observations are related to each other within them, but not necessarily 
between them. By using the cluster option at the end of the xtreg command, I 
obtain standard errors and test statistics (including t statistics and F statistics) so 
that they are valid even with heteroscedasticity.83 We must bear in mind once again 
that heteroscedasticity does not cause bias or inconsistency in the coefficients, but 
invalidates the test statistics.  
Sales, which are a proxy for the company’s size, show a particular behavior 
in relation with leverage. In fact, most part of the observations lie in a very short 
range of sales. To smoothen this very abrupt display of observations and spread 
them more homogenously, I use the well-known logarithm operator. Consequently, 
the level of heteroscedasticity present in our data is reduced. The same treatment 
can also be applied to tangibility to decrease heteroscedasticity. 
In case we would like to see if leverage has a shrinking or increasing trend 
across year and include company fixed-effects, the following regression would be 
appropriate: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 log(𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 
If, on the contrary, we are more interested in a general regression of 
leverage with company and time fixed-effects, it would look like this: 
                                               
80 See Torres-Reyna (2007), p. 35. 
81 See Wooldridge (2013), pp. 258f. 
82 See StataCorp. (2013), pp. 359-364. 
83 See Wooldridge (2013), p. 688.  
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖  and 𝛼𝑡 represent the company fixed-effects and the time fixed-
effects, respectively. Subindex “i” represents the firm and subindex “t” represents 
the year.84 The leverage of firm is denoted by 𝑦 and 𝑑 represents a dummy 
variable, also known as a binary variable with a value of zero for a group and a 
value of one for the other. In our case, zero corresponds to the pre-reform period, 
and one corresponds to the post-reform period, event date included. The random, 
unobserved error term, which contains all omitted variables affecting 𝑦, is 
represented by 𝜀. 
 
4.3. Leverage change 
 
The following fourth and fifth steps have the purpose of finally helping us 
determine if leverage changed its trend after the insolvency reform had 
commenced, and thus so did the creditors’ lending behaviour. Two different 
approaches are taken to give an answer to this question: the Chow test and the 
Difference-in-Difference estimation. Although they both ultimately rely on 
regressions, the idea that lies behind is somehow different.  
 
4.3.1. Chow test for structural change across time 
 
The fourth step is to conduct the Chow test. Such test is highly used when 
working with time-series data in order to observe if an event on a certain date has 
modified significantly the behavior of said data, and therefore, there has been what 
is called a structural change.85 In our specific case, this test will What the Chow 
test does, more specifically, is to check if two different regressions, one before and 
one after the event date, are equal by looking at the coefficients of their 
independent variables. To implement that with Stata, I construct two regressions 
in one by including a dummy variable and interacting all independent variables with 
our time dummy variable.86 The reason why I also include interaction terms in the 
regression is that I are not only interested in an intercept shift, but also want to 
allow for a difference in slopes, which will tell us if the impact of the other variables 
                                               
84 From this point on I omit to mention the subindexes „i“ and „t“ when referring to variables in the 
text to ease notation. 
85 See Baum (2006), p. 183.  
86 See Wooldridge (2013), p. 437. 
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in leverage differ between before and after the reform. Only then I will be able to 
test the equality of regression parameters across time periods and see if there is 
a statistically significant difference in leverage, or in other words, an actual 
structural break. The second part of the Chow test is to test for joint significance of 
the year dummy and all of the interaction terms, whose null hypothesis is that 
leverage follows the same model for both groups, or in other words, for the period 
before and after the reform date. This null hypothesis can be written as follows: 
 
𝐻0: 𝛾 = 0, 𝛿𝑖 = 0 (4) 
 
where 𝛾 corresponds to the coefficient of the dummy variable and 𝛿𝑖  to the 
coefficient for each interaction term.87 If one of those coefficients is different from 
zero, then the model is different for before and after the reform. To let the intercept 
term of the regression change, however, I only test the interaction terms jointly. It 
is important to know that in we cannot rely on the individual t statistics for testing a 
joint hypothesis such as the one mentioned. The regression used for the Chow test 
would look like this: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑡
+ 𝛿1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠_𝑑𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿3log (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)_𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4log (𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)_𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
 
where variables 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑑, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠_𝑑, log (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)_𝑑 
and log (𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)_𝑑 represent the already mentioned interaction terms. 
When dealing with the Chow test, I encounter an issue that was not present 
before: multicollinearity. Multicollinearity, understood as the fact of independent 
variables being not only correlated to the dependent variable but also to each 
other, might be a problem with regression analysis. It increases standard errors of 
coefficients, which can lead to conclude that the respective variables are 
statistically insignificant when they should not be.88 The reason multicollinearity 
appears now and in an excessive amount is because of the presence of the 
interaction terms needed in the Chow test.  In our particular case, log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) and 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)_𝑑 seem to be highly correlated to each other as their variation inflation 
                                               
87 See Wooldridge (2013), p. 236. 
88 See The Minitab Blog (2013) 
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factor (VIF) shows. Therefore, multicollinearity is a problem that needs to be 
solved. One way to decrease it is by standardizing the predictor log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠).89 
 
4.3.1.1. Traditional Chow test 
 
There is another way to prove if there is a structural break in our data other 
than doing the Chow test with time dummies and interaction terms: computing the 
F statistic of the traditional Chow test. This method to implement the Chow test, 
which would be referred to as traditional Chow test, is normally used in cases 
where there is a lot of explanatory variables, what would represent a lot of 
interactions to test for group differences. The F statistic For the Chow test, also 
called Chow statistic, is as follows:90 
 
𝐹 =
[𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑝 − (𝑆𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑅2)]
𝑆𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑅2
·
[𝑁 − 2(𝑘 + 1)]
𝑘 + 1
 
(6) 
 
As we can see, the F statistic is based only in the sum-of-squared residuals of the 
pooled regression (SSRp), the regression for group 1 (SSR1) and the regression 
for group 2 (SSR2). N refers to the number of observations and k to the number of 
interaction terms.  
One limitation of the F statistic for the traditional Chow test is that the H0 
does not allow for differences at all between groups, meaning that either both 
groups are exactly equal or not. There is no allowance for only intercept difference, 
for example.91 The other limitation regarding the traditional Chow test is that, as 
we already know, the presence of heteroscedasticity makes the F statistic based 
on the sum-of-squared residuals not valid. Therefore, the previous equation is not 
valid in our case and a heteroscedasticity-robust F statistic needs to be computed. 
Unfortunately, computing said statistic manually is much more time-consuming, 
since we cannot rely on the sum-of-squared residuals anymore and instead we 
must use the robust variance-covariance matrix.92 However, a heteroscedasticity-
robust F statistic can be easily computed in Stata by simply using the option 
vce(cluster id) at the end of the xtreg command, as mentioned in Section 
4.2.5.  
 
                                               
89 See The Minitab Blog (2016) 
90 See Wooldridge (2013), pp. 235-237.   
91 Ibid., p. 237. 
92 Ibid., p. 263.  
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4.3.2. Difference-in-Difference estimator 
 
The fifth and last step of the analysis is the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
estimator. The DiD estimator is a Double Difference estimator is the combination 
of two other estimators: Single Pre versus Post Estimator and Simple Treatment 
versus Control Estimator. The former measures the leverage difference between 
the pre-reform and the post-reform period in the treatment group93, while the latter 
measures the outcome difference between the treatment and the control group in 
the post-reform period. The DiD estimation circumvents problems like endogeneity 
problems94 (correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term) and 
thus appears to be stronger than the Chow test that I carried out previously in terms 
of reliability, since the F statistic of the Chow test only compares two regressions 
belonging to two different time periods.  
The regression used for Difference-in-Difference estimation is shown 
below: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is referred to the control variables mentioned above plus the GDP 
of the country to account for business cycles and 𝛾 denotes a vector of coefficients 
for each of the variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The variable 𝑑 is the post-reform indicator equal to 
one in the post-reform period, while 𝑇 is the country indicator equal to one for the 
treatment group. The variable 𝑇𝑑 is the product of the two precedent variables in 
the regression, and consequently, it is also a dummy variable. The Difference-in-
difference estimator is represented by 𝛽4 and compares the difference in leverage 
in the treatment group before and after the reform, denoted by 𝛽2+𝛽4, to the 
difference in leverage in the control group before and after the reform, denoted by 
𝛽2. The difference of those two differences can be written is as follows
95:  
 
𝛽4̂ = (?̅?𝑑=1,𝑇=1 − ?̅?𝑑=0,𝑇=1) − (?̅?𝑑=1,𝑇=0 − ?̅?𝑑=0,𝑇=0) 
𝐸[𝛽4̂] = (𝐸[?̅?𝑑=1,𝑇=1] − 𝐸[?̅?𝑑=0,𝑇=1]) − (𝐸[?̅?𝑑=1,𝑇=0] − 𝐸[?̅?𝑑=0,𝑇=0]) 
𝐸[𝛽4̂] = (𝛽2 + 𝛽4) − (𝛽2) = 𝛽4 
(8) 
 
                                               
93 To be in accordance with the referenced literature, I use the terminology of “treatment and control 
group” from now on when referring to the country that enacted the law and the country that did not, 
respectively. 
94 See Roberts/Whited (2012), pp. 6, 34-36; Albouy (2004), pp. 2f. 
95 See Roberts/Whited (2012), p. 39. 
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The following table helps understand what the rest of the coefficients found in the 
Difference-in-Difference regression actually measure96: 
Table 5. Slope coefficients of the Difference-in-Difference regression 
 Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-post Difference 
Treatment 𝛽0+𝛾+𝛽3 𝛽0+𝛾+𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4 𝛽2+𝛽4 
Control 𝛽0+𝛾 𝛽0+𝛾+𝛽2 𝛽2 
T-C Difference 𝛽0+𝛾+𝛽3 𝛽0+𝛾+𝛽3+𝛽4 𝛽4 
 
As can be seen from the table, the Difference-in-Difference estimator can also be 
understood as the comparison of the difference in leverage between both groups 
before the reform and the difference in leverage between both groups after the 
reform. In the table above, the Single Pre versus Post Estimator is represented by 
𝛽2+𝛽4 and the Simple Treatment versus Control Estimator is denoted by 𝛽3+𝛽4. It 
is important to notice that even though variable 𝑑 appears in Eq. (5) and Eq. (8) 
and is created in the same way, the interpretation of its coefficient differs between 
both cases. Regarding Eq. (5), 𝛾 represents the change in the mean leverage when 
going from pre-treatment to the post-treatment period. However, in Eq. (8), 𝛽2 
captures the difference in leverage between both periods in the control group. The 
equivalent of 𝛾 in its interpretation would be the Single Pre versus Post Estimator, 
𝛽2+𝛽4, as mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
To compute the DiD estimator, first I need to make sure that the assumption 
of Parallel Trend between the treatment group and the control group is fulfilled, in 
the sense of both having the same leverage trend in the pre-reform period. Such 
verification is usually done by means of graphical tools.97 To increase the likelihood 
of the Parallel Trend beforehand, it is important that the treatment group and the 
control group have a shared law frame so they are as similar as possible in terms 
of insolvency policies. In the first case of Germany, the control group chosen is 
Austria because they are both German-civil-law countries. For that reason, they 
offer lower protection to both shareholders and investors than Common-law 
countries, although higher than French-civil-law countries (closer to the latter). 
Regarding Spain, the correspondent chosen control group is France, since they 
are French-civil-law countries. They have the weakest protection to both 
shareholders and investors. In the matter of Brazil, the control group is Portugal, 
another French-civil-law country. However, the Law of Portugal had some 
amendments coming from the German civil tradition at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Brazil is based in Portuguese law with also German influences.98 The 
                                               
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., pp. 41f. 
98 See Brüggemeier (2011), pp. 203f. 
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same pattern shows for choosing a control group for Portugal, which happens to 
be The Netherlands.99 
4.3.2.1. Matching approach 
 
However, our Difference-in-Difference analysis could be refined by 
previously matching our data, which would increase the comparability of both 
treatment and control group. The basic idea behind the matching approach is to 
make both treatment and control group as similar as possible so any differences 
between the two groups can only be assumed to be a result of the treatment100. 
There is a wide variety of matching approaches available depending on the 
measure of the similarity between two units, also called “distance”. Some of these 
approaches are used to do exact matching -match treated and control units which 
have the same values of covariates-, while others are used to do approximate 
matching -match treated units with control units that are close to each other-. The 
distance used in approximate matching is generally either the Mahalanobis 
distance or the Propensity Score.101 Both Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) 
and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) are often implemented through one-to-one 
nearest-neighbor greedy matching, meaning that a treated unit is matched to the 
closest comparison individual or control unit according to the preselected measure. 
The matching approach can include replacement as well, which means that a 
control unit is used several times as a match, as opposed to without replacement, 
where a control unit can only be used once.102   
In our particular analysis, I am interested in matching firms between the 
treatment and the control group that not only have a similar size, but also belong 
to the same industry. Our first part of the matching consists on one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching where the Mahalanobis distance is the measure assessing the 
similarity between observations. As stated by Roberts and Whited103, only 
variables that are not affected by the treatment should be included in the matching 
process. The variable sales, used as a proxy for firm size, meets this requirement. 
However, the Stata command teffects nnmatch104 used in this case for the 
matching approach does not understand panel data. This means that it does not 
care about clusters and thus treats each observation as independent (e.g. firm A 
in year 2008 could be matched with firm X, but firm A in year 2009 could be 
matched with firm Y also). On the contrary, I intend to match one treatment firm 
                                               
99 See La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1130f. 
100 “Treatment“ refers to the commencement of the insolvency reform. 
101 See Blackwell et al. (2010), p. 2. 
102 See Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005), p. 9. 
103 See Roberts/Whited (2012), p. 75. 
104 See StataCorp. (2015), pp. 266-269. 
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with the same control firm across all years of study. To achieve that, one way is to 
first change the dataset long format into wide format. Only then, each company 
would be one single observation. It is obvious, however, that each company cannot 
be matched on sales for each year, so matching firms on the average sales over 
time in the pre-treatment period is a good workaround.     
Additionally, I am also interested in matching observations on industry as 
previously mentioned. However, Stata does not allow doing so with the data 
available. The reason behind is that in order to perform such matching approach, 
Stata needs minimum three matches on industry for each treated observation in 
the treatment group or control observation in the control group to estimate the 
robust standard errors.105 For most of the countries, this is rarely the case, since 
companies tend to be spread across industries heterogeneously, thus making it 
very difficult to see all industries with three or more companies each. This issue 
leaves no other option than to discard matching on industry with the data available.  
Replacement is included in the matching approach as well, since I consider 
that it increases substantially the quality of the matching. It does so by allowing 
treated and control units that are similar to other units to be used more than once. 
I could also perform caliper matching, which is a variant of one-to-one matching 
with the particularity of increasing the quality of matches by imposing a maximum 
allowed distance on the sales between a treat and control units. This distance, 
called caliper radius, has the same purpose that replacement, in the sense of 
avoiding ending up with poor-quality matches.106 The problem with calipers is that 
it is generally not trivial what caliper to choose as reasonable and also it becomes 
even more complex in our case since the variable “sales” has a very large range 
of values. Although including a second exact matching on years in our matching 
approach would probably mean much more accurate results, it cannot be 
accomplished due to a lack of observations.  
Once the above mentioned matching approach is implemented, the 
reduced matched sample needs to be constructed. First, I change the dataset wide 
format back to long format or panel dataset. In addition, I need to account for the 
fact that several control units are used as a match more than once, since the 
matching approach used the option replacement. Therefore, each of those units 
has to be duplicated in the dataset as many times as they have been used as a 
match, minus one. The command expandcl in Stata does exactly this. At the end, 
the number of treated and control units should be the same if the duplication has 
been done properly.  
                                               
105 See StataCorp. (2015), pp. 268,276. 
106 See Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005), p. 10. 
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Before jumping into the Difference-in-Difference estimation, however, it is 
important first to examine the quality of the resulting matched sample. To do so, 
several numerical diagnostics, such as the standardized difference in means or the 
two sample t-test (see Section 4.2.2), are available.107 Both of them compare 
covariate distribution, in our case only the variable sales, before and after 
matching. Additionally, graphical diagnostics, such as box plots, can be used.108 
These two mentioned quality diagnostics are also mentioned in the Stata 
documentation.109 If the matching quality appears to be satisfying, then Difference-
in-Difference regression can be implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
107 See Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005), pp. 15f. 
108 See Stuart (2010), p. 15. 
109 See StataCorp. (2015), pp. 169-173,184-189. 
35 
 
5 Results 
 
Graphs and numeric results, such as descriptive statistics and test p-
values, are shown in this section. A significance level of 0.05 is used for all 
statistical tests.  The most important Stata commands used in each step of the 
analysis are all collected and presented in Appendix A. For the reason already 
mentioned in Section 4.1, the results displayed below exclude financial institutions. 
Since the same analysis is conducted for all four countries, all cases show the 
same pattern in terms of presented results. In order not to be too repetitive, a 
lengthy description of each result and additional comments are only provided for 
the first country when possible. 
 
5.1. Germany 
 
The most important descriptive statistics of leverage are presented in the 
following table thanks to the user-written code univar available in Stata. As 
mentioned in Section 4.1, the stock indices used in the case of Germany are DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics. Germany. 
Leverage Total Pre-reform Post-reform 
N 735 315 420 
Mean 22.13 23.03 21.46 
Stdt. Deviation 17.24 17.94 16.69 
Min 0 0 0 
P25 8.22 8.45 8.06 
Median 20.49 21.89 19.60 
P75 32.19 33.37 30.98 
Max 70.32 70.32 70.32 
 
Firms show a slight decrease in leverage after the reform (ΔM = -1.57 pp). As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.1, however, this result only corresponds to the sample 
data and is not sufficient to conclude a significant leverage change in the whole 
population between periods. 
In the two-sample t test, no statistically significant difference in the 
population means of leverage between the pre-reform and post-reform period was 
found, t(650.89) = 1.21 , p = 0.2265. However, and as previously said in Section 
4.2.2, I cannot affirm that there is no change in leverage trend based on this result. 
Referring to Section 4.2.3, different multiple linear regression models are 
estimated with the purpose of determining what predictors of leverage are 
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significant. In the first regression I want to see if there is an overall time trend of 
our leverage, or in other words, what is the overall direction our leverage is moving 
across time (the effect is not specific to any year), while controlling for the other 
explanatory variables. The rest of the nine regressions are classified in three 
different time frames around the reform date. For each time frame, I first include 
company fixed-effects, and later also time fixed-effects (See Section 4.2.4). The 
most interesting regressions are the last three, since they include company and 
time fixed-effects, and specially the first of those. Because said multiple 
regressions are not part of the main results strictly speaking, they are all found in 
tables in Appendix B, together with some remarks. 
But again, regressions only serve the purpose of discovering what are the 
relations between the dependent and independent variables. After dealing with 
multicollinearity and running the joint test (See Section 4.3.1), no interaction term 
shows to be significant, F(4,104) = 0.76, p = 0.5549, indicating that the only 
difference between the two regressions is the intercept term. Because all 
interaction terms have been tested jointly, I can drop them out of the equation all 
at the same time. The new regression without the interaction terms shows 𝑑 to be 
statistically significant, F(1,104) = 6.49, p = 0.0123, indicating that the leverage 
was significantly 2.568 pp lower before the reform than after the reform. 
Before looking at the results from the Difference-in-Difference estimation, it 
is advisable to first check if the matching approach has been implemented 
properly, as mentioned in Section 4.3.2.1. After verifying that the number of firms 
in the treatment group is the same of those in the control group, I asses the quality 
of the matching by using numerical and graphical diagnostics. In the following 
table, the standardized difference in sales means between both treatment and 
control group before and after matching are shown: 
 
Table 7. Standardized differences between treatment and control group. Germany. 
 Standardized differences 
 Before matching After matching 
sales -0.3557 -0.2651 
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According to Caliendo and Kopeinig110, a standardized difference reduction below 
5% is often seen as enough. Table 6 proves this requirement is met by far. The 
following box plot also help us diagnose the covariate balance, where Germany is 
the Treatment group and Austria is the Control group.  
 
The boxplots of the matched data also indicate a better covariate balance after 
matching, since the covariate distribution becomes more similar. Therefore, I 
conclude that the quality of the matching approach is good and the Difference-in-
                                               
110 See Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005), p. 15. 
Figure 1. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group before the 
matching. Germany. 
 
Figure 2. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group after the 
matching. Germany. 
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Difference estimation can be implemented. The following graphs illustrate the 
mean leverage for each year between groups before and after matching. The 
reform date is represented by Year=0.  
 
 
 
As is shown by Fig. 3, the mean leverage for the treatment and control group is 
different; German firms are more leveraged than Austrian firms, on average. Both 
figures also illustrate the approximate fulfillment of the Parallel Trend assumption; 
both countries have decreasing time trend in leverage. In Appendix D, the 
complete tables of the Difference-in-Difference regressions can be found. The 
Figure 3. Leverage between 2009 and 2015 for the treatment and control 
group before matching. Germany. 
Figure 4. Leverage between 2009 and 2015 for the treatment and control 
group after matching. Germany. 
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following table shows only the p-values of two of the most interesting coefficients 
of the Difference-in-Difference regression before and after matching, as stated in 
Section 4.3.2: 
 
Table 8. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2012 as the event 
date. Germany. 
Event date: 2012 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before matching After matching 
𝛽2 0.808 0.418 
𝛽4 0.267 0.921 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.249 0.196 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, I now compute the Difference-in-Difference estimator 
in the case where the event date is a year prior to the reform commencement date: 
Table 9. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2011 as the event 
date. Germany. 
Event date: 2011 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.230 0.254 
𝛽4 0.825 0.930 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.082 0.131 
 
Some remarks can be derived from Table 8: 
 The Single Pre versus Post Estimator shows a p-value above the 
significance level for both situations, meaning that the treatment group 
does not experience a mean change in leverage between the pre and post-
reform period.  
 The Difference-in-Difference estimator has a quite high p-value in both 
cases, meaning that the reform does not have a significant effect, and thus 
there was no change after the reform in leverage experienced by firms in 
Germany relative to the change in leverage experienced by firms in Austria. 
 It can be drawn from the above results that the matching approach is not 
really helping in the case of Germany. Actually, and as pointed out by 
Schechter in Stata FAQ111, the impact of matching is not predictable, and 
sometimes can lead to decreasing the apparent magnitude of the treatment 
effect. 
 
 
 
                                               
111 See Stata FAQ (2017) 
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5.2. Spain 
 
The most important descriptive statistics of leverage are presented in the 
following table. The stock indices used in this case are: IBEX35, IBEX Medium 
Cap and IBEX Small Cap. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics. Spain. 
Leverage Total Pre-reform Post-reform 
N 336 144 192 
Mean 33.36 33.72 33.10 
Stdt. Deviation 18.62 18.48 18.77 
Min 0.01 0.49 0.01 
P25 19.31 19.43 18.71 
Median 31.77 31.79 31.77 
P75 46.63 47.20 45.93 
Max 84.84 72.18 84.84 
 
Firms show a very slight decrease in leverage after the reform (ΔM = -0.62 pp). 
 
In the two-sample t test, no statistically significant difference in the 
population means of leverage between the pre-reform and post-reform period was 
found, t(313.62) = 0.30, p = 0.7613. 
After dealing with multicollinearity and running the joint test, no interaction 
term shows to be significant, F(4,47) = 1.52, p = 0.2106. Because all interaction 
terms have been tested jointly, I can drop them out of the equation all at the same 
time. The new regression without the interaction terms shows 𝑑 to be statistically 
insignificant, F(1,47) = 0.21, p = 0.6462, indicating that there was no significant 
change in leverage before and after the reform. 
In the following table, the standardized difference in sales means between 
both treatment and control group before and after matching are shown: 
 
Table 11. Standardized differences between treatment and control group. Spain. 
 Standardized differences 
 Before matching After matching 
sales 0.0662 -0.0065 
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The following box plot also help us diagnose the covariate balance, where Spain 
is the treatment group and France is the Control group: 
 
 
The boxplots indicate a better covariate balance after matching as well. The 
following graphs show the mean leverage for each year between groups before 
and after matching. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group before the 
matching. Spain. 
Figure 6. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group after the 
matching. Spain. 
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As is shown by Fig. 7, the treatment group has a mean leverage higher than the 
control group. Also the Parallel Trend assumption is approximately fulfilled in both 
cases.  
 
Figure 7. Leverage between 2008 and 2014 for the treatment and control 
group before matching. Spain. 
Figure 8. Leverage between 2008 and 2014 for the treatment and control 
group after matching. Spain. 
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Table 12. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2011 as the event 
date. Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2010 as the event 
date. Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some remarks from Table 12: 
 The Single Pre versus Post Estimator shows in this case a very high p-
value. This means that there is no mean change in leverage from before to 
after the reform for Spain.  
 The Difference-in-Difference estimator has a high p-value in both 
situations, meaning that the reform date does not have a significant effect, 
and thus, there was no change after the reform in leverage experienced by 
firms in Spain relative to the change in leverage experienced by firms in 
France. 
 It seems that in the case of Spain the matching approach does not help 
increase the treatment effects generally speaking either. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event date: 2011 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.109 0.327 
𝛽4 0.781 0.812 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.110 0.459 
Event date: 2010 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.629 0.489 
𝛽4 0.536 0.266 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.727 0.468 
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5.3. Portugal 
 
The most important descriptive statistics of leverage are presented in the 
following table. The stock index used in the case of Portugal is the PSI20. 
 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics. Portugal. 
Leverage Total Pre-reform Post-reform 
N 98 42 56 
Mean 34.79 38.08 32.33 
Stdt. Deviation 17.64 18.15 17 
Min 0.04 4.54 0.04 
P25 24.59 26.34 20.12 
Median 30.96 35.66 29.81 
P75 42.68 45.36 40.88 
Max 75.78 75.78 71.04 
 
Firms show a decrease in leverage after the reform (ΔM = -5.75 pp). 
 
In the two-sample t test, no statistically significant difference in the 
population means of leverage between the pre-reform and post-reform period was 
found, t(87.10) = 1.59, p = 0.1143. 
After dealing with multicollinearity and running the joint test, no interaction 
term shows to be significant, F(4,13) = 4.24, p = 0.0205, indicating that in this case 
the interaction terms are statistically significant. 
In the following table, the standardized difference in sales means between 
both treatment and control group before and after matching are shown: 
 
Table 15. Standardized differences between treatment and control group. Portugal. 
 Standardized differences 
 Before matching After matching 
sales 0.2402 0.0034 
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The following box plot also help us diagnose the covariate balance, where Portugal 
is the treatment group and The Netherlands is the Control group: 
 
The boxplots of the matched again indicate a better balance of the covariate. The 
following graphs show the mean leverage for both groups before and after 
matching: 
Figure 9. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group before the 
matching. Portugal. 
Figure 10. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group after the 
matching. Portugal. 
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As is shown by Fig. 11, the treatment group has a mean leverage higher than the 
control group. Also the Parallel Trend assumption is approximately fulfilled in both 
situations.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Leverage between 2009 and 2015 for the treatment and control 
group before matching. Portugal. 
Figure 12. Leverage between 2009 and 2015 for the treatment and control 
group after matching. Portugal. 
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Table 16. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2012 as the event 
date. Portugal. 
Event date: 2012 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.250 0.898 
𝛽4 0.290 0.357 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.162 0.484 
 
Table 17. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2011 as the event 
date. Portugal. 
Event date: 2011 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.0496 0.665 
𝛽4 0.633 0.649 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.143 0.882 
 
 
Some remarks from Table 16: 
 The Single Pre versus Post Estimator shows a p-value a bit above the 
significance level before and after matching. This means that there is no 
mean change in leverage from before to after the reform for Portugal.  
 The Difference-in-Difference estimator reflects a high p-value in both 
situations, meaning that the reform does not have a significant effect, and 
thus, there was no change after the reform in leverage experienced by firms 
in Portugal relative to the change in leverage experienced by firms in The 
Netherlands. 
 As can be observed, until now the matching approach does not increase 
the treatment effect, but instead in this case the matching reduces it. 
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5.4. Brazil 
 
The most important descriptive statistics of leverage are presented in the 
following table. The observations come from the most important Brazilian stock 
index known as BOVESPA. 
 
Table 18. Descriptive statistics. Brazil. 
Leverage Total Pre-reform Post-reform 
N 154 66 88 
Mean 31.18 34.62 28.60 
Stdt. Deviation 14.05 14.11 13.52 
Min 2.50 3.03 2.50 
P25 21.30 25.67 18.69 
Median 30.95 34.25 26.81 
P75 41.19 46.01 38.10 
Max 64.41 64.41 62.01 
 
Firms show a noticeable decrease in leverage after the reform (ΔM = -6.02 pp). 
 
In the two-sample t test, there is a statistically significant difference in the 
population means of leverage between the pre-reform and post-reform period, 
t(138.79) = 2.67, p = 0.0085.  
After dealing with multicollinearity and running the joint test, no interaction 
term shows to be significant, F(4,21) = 0.90, p = 0.4832. Because all interaction 
terms have been tested jointly, I can drop them out of the equation all at the same 
time. The new regression without the interaction terms shows 𝑑 to be statistically 
insignificant, F(1,21) = 19.41, p < 0.001, indicating that the leverage was 
significantly 15.675 pp lower before the reform than after the reform. 
In the following table, the standardized difference in sales means between 
both treatment and control group before and after matching are shown: 
 
Table 19. Standardized differences between the treatment and control group. Brazil. 
 Standardized differences 
 Before matching After matching 
sales -0.9120 -0.6886 
 
The following box plot also help us diagnose the covariate balance, where Brazil 
is the Treatment group and Portugal is the Control group: 
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Both box plots show that after the matching the covariate sales has a more similar 
distribution regarding the treatment group. The following graphs show the mean 
leverage for each year for each group before and after matching:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group before the 
matching. Brazil. 
Figure 14. Box plot of sales for the treatment and control group after the 
matching. Brazil. 
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As is shown by Fig. 15, the treatment group has a mean leverage below that of the 
control group. Also the Parallel Trend assumption is better fulfilled after matching.  
 
Figure 15. Leverage between 2002 and 2008 for the treatment and control 
group before matching. Brazil. 
Figure 16. Leverage between 2002 and 2008 for the treatment and control 
group after matching. Brazil. 
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Table 20. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2005 as the event 
date. Brazil. 
 
Table 21. P-values of the most important coefficients in the DiD regression with 2004 as the event 
date. Brazil. 
 
 
Some remarks: 
 The Single Pre versus Post Estimator decreases its p-value below the 
significance level after matching. This means that there is a mean change 
in leverage from before to after the reform for the treatment group.  
 The Difference-in-Difference estimator becomes more significant after 
matching. Therefore, there was a change after the reform in leverage 
experienced by firms in Brazil relative to the change in leverage 
experienced by firms in Portugal. 
 As mentioned before, the matching approach helps increase the treatment 
effect in the case of Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event date: 2005 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.001 0.027 
𝛽4 0.160 0.027 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.001 <0.001 
Event date: 2004 P-value 
Difference-in-Difference Before Matching After Matching 
𝛽2 0.446 0.915 
𝛽4 0.189 0.025 
𝛽2+𝛽4 0.291 0.045 
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6 Conclusion 
 
Results of the Difference-in-Difference estimator show that none of the studied 
countries, except for Brazil, had a significant leverage change in their companies 
after the reforms commenced. Not even by matching data beforehand I could see 
significant leverage changes in Germany, Spain or Portugal. Those countries also 
did not show a change in leverage if the event date was considered to be a year 
before the commencement. On the contrary, Brazil did show a change in the 
leverage behavior of its investors after the reform commencement. In this case, 
using the matching approach helped increase the treatment effect. Because the 
Brazilian insolvency law Law 11101/05 is thought to be a creditor-friendly reform, 
at least in some aspects, the leverage decrease supports the demand-view of the 
relation between creditor protection and leverage, which states that strong creditor 
rights lead to managers decreasing leverage and thus reducing the risk of 
bankruptcy. This found negative relation between creditor rights and leverage is in 
line with the findings of El Gohul et al.112 The idea that strong creditor rights imply 
risk-avoiding behavior from the management side is also supported by Acharya, 
Ahimud and Litov113, who report that strong creditor rights lead firms to opt for risk-
reducing acquisitions. 
                                               
112 See Gohul et al. (2011) 
113 See Acharya/Amihud/Litov (2008), p. 27. cited in El Gohul et al. (2011) 
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Appendix A. Stata commands 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
univar lev_w if finan_inst==0  
univar lev_w if finan_inst==0 & d==0 
univar lev_w if finan_inst==0 & d==1 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
ttest lev_w if finan_inst==0, by(d) welch 
 
Chow test for structural change across time – regression 
xtreg lev_w i.year mb_w s_logsales roa_w logtang d mb_d logsales_d 
roa_d logtang_d if finan_inst==0, fe vce(cluster companycode) 
 
Chow test for structural change across time – joint test 
test roa_d mb_d logsales_d logtang_d  
 
Matching approach 
teffects nnmatch (mymean_leverage mymean_sales) (treatment), 
generate(match) osample(newvar) metric(euclidean) 
 
Quality of matching – standardized differences in means 
stddiff sales_w, by(treatment) 
 
Quality of matching – box plot 
graph box sales_w, over(treatment) asyvars box(1,color(blue)) 
box(2, color(green)) nooutside title("Balance of covariate") 
subtitle("(after matching)") ylabel(,labsize(small)) 
legend(order(1 "Control group" 2 "Treatment 
group"))graphregion(color(white)) 
 
Difference-in-Difference estimator – regression 
xtreg lev_w i.year mb_w logsales roa_w logtang GDP d treatment 
treatmentxd if finan_inst==0, fe vce (cluster companycode) 
 
Difference-in-Difference estimator – graph 
graph twoway (connected meanc_w`W' yearcode, sort lcolor(blue) 
mcolor(blue) msymbol(circle)) (connected meant_w`W' yearcode, sort 
lcolor(green) mcolor(green) msymbol(triangle)), title(Leverage over 
time) subtitle((after matching)) legend(order(1 "Control group" 2 
"Treatment group")) ytitle(Leverage (%)) xtitle(Time (years)) 
graphregion(color(white)) 
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Appendix B. Multiple linear regression models 
 
Table 22. Determinants of leverage for Germany. This table presents ordinary least squares regressions, using a sample of 105 non-financial firms over the period 2009-2015. The dependent 
variable is leverage. Results are shown separately for different time windows, where [-2 +2], for example, indicates the two years prior and post the reform of 2012. Variable d is the post-reform 
indicator equal to one after 2012, 2012 included, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Independent [-3 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 
variables +3] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] 
           
d  -1.938** -1.504** -0.415 -2.324*** -1.801** -0.552 -2.568** -2.472*** -0.521 
  (0.759) (0.698) (0.674) (0.722) (0.691) (0.653) (1.008) (0.735) (0.612) 
year2010        -0.0139   
        (0.766)   
year2011        -1.654* -1.668**  
        (0.916) (0.640)  
year2013        -0.419 -0.283 -0.107 
        (0.525) (0.560) (0.521) 
year2014        -0.693 -0.596  
        (0.659) (0.663)  
year2015        -1.245   
        (0.923)   
Market to book value 0.624* 0.544* 0.436 -0.125 0.544 0.484 -0.130 0.560* 0.399 -0.102 
 (0.335) (0.310) (0.473) (0.563) (0.332) (0.509) (0.636) (0.336) (0.532) (0.673) 
Log(Sales) 3.443* 1.088 0.846 0.612 2.609 2.520 2.164 3.632** 3.425 2.217 
 (1.804) (0.700) (0.803) (0.779) (1.739) (2.004) (2.629) (1.814) (2.135) (2.668) 
Return on assets -0.437*** -0.421*** -0.327*** -0.282*** -0.433*** -0.338*** -0.291** -0.441*** -0.356*** -0.293** 
 (0.0913) (0.0982) (0.0952) (0.0821) (0.0940) (0.101) (0.111) (0.0918) (0.0999) (0.113) 
Log(Tangibility) 4.568*** 4.605*** 4.840*** 3.863*** 4.697*** 4.893*** 3.560*** 4.591*** 4.821*** 3.532*** 
 (1.293) (1.116) (1.165) (0.922) (1.259) (1.388) (1.219) (1.304) (1.395) (1.251) 
Year -0.685***          
 (0.215)          
Constant -17.47 17.74 21.10 22.75* -3.697 -2.800 -0.0979 -17.91 -14.75 -0.950 
 (25.52) (10.98) (12.97) (12.79) (24.31) (28.59) (37.59) (25.45) (30.26) (38.29) 
           
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 735 735 525 315 735 525 315 735 525 315 
R-squared 0.155    0.150 0.165 0.132 0.159 0.178 0.133 
Number of 
companies 
105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23. Determinants of leverage for Spain. This table presents ordinary least squares regressions, using a sample of 48 non-financial firms over the period 2008-2014. The dependent 
variable is leverage. Results are shown separately for different time windows, where [-2 +2], for example, indicates the two years prior and post the reform of 2011. Variable d is the post-reform 
indicator equal to one after 2011, 2011 included, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Independent [-3 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 
variables +3] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] 
           
d  -0.381 -0.395 0.0489 -0.410 -0.442 -0.113 -0.616 -2.164* -0.973 
  (1.095) (1.054) (0.897) (1.093) (1.082) (0.952) (1.333) (1.239) (0.780) 
year2009        1.335   
        (0.957)   
year2010        0.415 -1.258  
        (1.150) (0.878)  
year2012        1.829 1.934 1.907 
        (1.303) (1.269) (1.255) 
year2013        1.114 1.319  
        (1.215) (1.218)  
year2014        0.278   
        (1.558)   
Market to book value 0.325 0.310 0.347 0.278 0.318 0.384 0.349 0.342 0.406 0.425 
 (0.228) (0.214) (0.262) (0.400) (0.229) (0.285) (0.453) (0.232) (0.280) (0.451) 
Log(Sales) 1.793 1.302 1.129 1.060 1.872 1.886 8.659 2.136 2.279 8.109 
 (3.114) (1.291) (1.375) (1.364) (3.140) (5.037) (6.407) (3.235) (5.151) (6.556) 
Return on assets -0.261*** -0.296*** -0.235** -0.134 -0.263*** -0.170 -0.0260 -0.251*** -0.148 -0.0130 
 (0.0855) (0.0824) (0.0999) (0.0869) (0.0859) (0.108) (0.0762) (0.0862) (0.102) (0.0691) 
Log(Tangibility) 4.206* 4.833** 4.537** 3.211 4.166* 3.214 -4.496 4.108* 2.878 -4.270 
 (2.335) (1.907) (2.145) (2.451) (2.340) (2.621) (3.545) (2.398) (2.637) (3.305) 
Year -0.0694          
 (0.293)          
Constant 14.45 22.80 24.69 22.84 13.52 11.58 -97.94 8.965 5.960 -90.04 
 (44.29) (18.45) (19.75) (20.30) (44.55) (71.53) (91.93) (46.06) (73.06) (93.83) 
           
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 336 336 240 144 336 240 144 336 240 144 
R-squared 0.095    0.096 0.066 0.052 0.106 0.082 0.078 
Number of 
companies 
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24. Determinants of leverage for Portugal. This table presents ordinary least squares regressions, using a sample of 14 non-financial firms over the period 2009-2015. The dependent 
variable is leverage. Results are shown separately for different time windows, where [-2 +2], for example, indicates the two years prior and post the reform of 2012. Variable d is the post-reform 
indicator equal to one after 2012, 2012 included, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Independent [-3 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 
variables +3] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] 
           
d  -2.695* -2.163 -2.433 -2.296 -1.914 -2.626 1.117 0.462 -1.605 
  (1.611) (1.433) (1.820) (1.650) (1.451) (1.905) (2.846) (2.030) (1.125) 
year2010        0.965   
        (1.536)   
year2011        2.463 1.963  
        (2.670) (1.986)  
year2013        -1.529 -1.831 -2.302 
        (2.418) (2.354) (2.431) 
year2014        -2.650 -2.294  
        (2.048) (1.930)  
year2015        -4.487*   
        (2.140)   
Market to book value 0.609 0.923 2.577 2.296 0.712 2.498 3.768 1.030 2.592 4.189 
 (0.796) (0.897) (1.747) (2.497) (0.800) (1.453) (2.434) (1.017) (1.807) (2.847) 
Log(Sales) -5.599 -3.031 -2.460 -2.618 -6.704 -7.072 -7.575** -5.674 -6.803 -7.885* 
 (5.556) (3.271) (3.233) (2.868) (5.665) (6.297) (3.060) (5.864) (6.733) (4.284) 
Return on assets -0.440 -0.579** -0.737* 0.425 -0.448 -0.760 0.113 -0.377 -0.643 0.0324 
 (0.340) (0.278) (0.416) (1.292) (0.352) (0.533) (1.573) (0.380) (0.508) (1.504) 
Log(Tangibility) 6.233 7.128 5.135 7.061* 6.907 3.344 2.510 8.626 2.606 -1.049 
 (7.212) (4.935) (3.679) (4.291) (7.468) (6.339) (8.954) (7.266) (7.217) (12.35) 
Year -0.741          
 (0.457)          
Constant 122.3 88.77* 76.65 77.43* 139.9* 140.1 142.1*** 124.8 133.8 142.5** 
 (76.33) (48.58) (48.88) (42.52) (77.55) (87.14) (42.70) (80.52) (93.50) (58.48) 
           
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 96 96 69 42 96 69 42 96 69 42 
R-squared 0.257    0.241 0.230 0.256 0.297 0.270 0.298 
Number of 
companies 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25. Determinants of leverage for Brazil. This table presents ordinary least squares regressions, using a sample of 22 non-financial firms over the period 2002-2018. The dependent 
variable is leverage. Results are shown separately for different time windows, where [-2 +2], for example, indicates the two years prior and post the reform of 2005. Variable d is the post-reform 
indicator equal to one after 2005, 2005 included, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Independent [-3 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 [-3 [-2 [-1 
variables +3] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] +3] +2] +1] 
           
d  -6.498*** -5.530*** -2.026 -5.964*** -5.236*** -3.872** -15.67*** -11.08*** -4.248** 
  (2.064) (1.885) (1.412) (1.861) (1.738) (1.377) (3.558) (2.659) (1.555) 
year2003        -5.869***   
        (1.701)   
year2004        -12.73*** -7.873***  
        (2.991) (1.751)  
year2006        1.121 0.980 1.545 
        (1.523) (1.667) (1.551) 
year2007        -2.569 -3.298  
        (2.324) (2.517)  
year2008        2.707   
        (1.889)   
Market to book value -0.562 -0.157 0.0660 -0.530 -0.486 -0.588 -1.573* -0.117 -0.550 -1.625* 
 (0.539) (0.467) (0.513) (0.578) (0.494) (0.678) (0.768) (0.478) (0.690) (0.805) 
Log(Sales) 3.340 0.416 0.951 3.720 0.591 3.499 14.89*** 5.824* 10.68*** 13.81*** 
 (2.531) (1.785) (2.243) (2.934) (2.289) (2.962) (2.867) (2.846) (2.506) (2.412) 
Return on assets -0.254 -0.213 -0.217 0.0484 -0.273 -0.339 0.0409 -0.0582 -0.0470 0.101 
 (0.192) (0.171) (0.241) (0.234) (0.188) (0.256) (0.204) (0.201) (0.284) (0.230) 
Log(Tangibility) 3.453 -0.117 1.090 -4.882 2.777 8.827 -10.91* 3.550 7.980 -10.45* 
 (8.777) (3.758) (3.747) (4.913) (8.568) (10.76) (5.382) (7.064) (9.129) (5.369) 
Year -1.864***          
 (0.603)          
Constant -13.98 30.92 20.84 -33.68 32.37 -8.478 -213.4*** -45.17 -121.4*** -196.6*** 
 (36.30) (30.79) (38.10) (49.82) (33.23) (44.82) (45.71) (39.35) (36.73) (38.42) 
           
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 154 154 110 66 154 110 66 154 110 66 
R-squared 0.162    0.166 0.173 0.331 0.326 0.282 0.346 
Number of 
companies 
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For the following remarks, I will be only focusing at the (8) regression of 
each table from Table 21 to Table 24. Results show that Germany is the only 
country where company leverage is correlated with all the determinants of leverage 
mentioned in Section 4.2.3. On the contrary, Portuguese firms show no correlation 
between leverage and those independent variables.  
Tangibility of assets is always positively correlated with leverage in all four 
countries. This strong relation is not surprising. As mentioned by Rajan and 
Zingales114, firms with a big proportion of fixed assets have the opportunity to use 
them as collateral in case of financial distress, thus making creditors more willing 
to lend them money. Return on assets appears to be negatively correlated with 
leverage in all countries. The reason behind is that profitable business tend to 
reduce external financing and rely more on internal funding. Sales, in turn, show a 
positive correlation with leverage in all countries except for Portugal. This positive 
relation can be explained by the fact that bigger companies, which means higher 
sales, have a better chance to rely on debt since they are seen as more reliable 
and less likely to fail.  Finally, results show that market to book value is correlated 
with leverage positively in all cases except for Brazil, which of what we could 
expect. Theory says that a company with high market to book value, which is a 
proxy for the future growth opportunities, finances itself with a greater amount of 
equity rather than debt.115 However, Chen and Zhao116 report that this is the case 
for firms with already high market to book value. If market to book value lies 
between low and medium, the relation with leverage then becomes negative. 
Actually, this fits with our results, since Brazilian companies appear to have the 
highest market to book value, on average.  
 The post-reform indicator shows to be statistically significant for Germany 
and Brazil, as already seen in the Chow test results. Therefore, those countries 
did experience a change in leverage after the insolvency reform commencement, 
both cases proving a leverage decrease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
114 See Rajan/Zingales (1995), p. 1451. 
115 Ibid. 
116 See Chen/Zhao (2006), p. 1.  
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Appendix C. Difference-in-difference estimator 
 
Table 26. Difference-in-Difference for Germany and Austria after matching. This table presents the 
Difference-in-Difference regression, using a sample of 120 matched firms over the period 2009-2015. 
Variable d is the post-reform indicator equal to one after 2012, 2012 included, and zero otherwise. 
Variable treatment is the country estimator equal to one for Germany and zero for Austria. In this 
case, Stata omits it because of the presence of the company fixed-effects. Variable treatmentxd is 
the treatment-effect indicator, product of the previously mentioned dummy variables. 
Independent   
variables Germany/Austria 
  
year2010 0.532 
 (0.932) 
year2011 -0.135 
 (1.236) 
year2013 -0.573 
 (0.373) 
year2014 0.0233 
 (1.032) 
year2015 0.147 
 (1.287) 
Market to book value 0.700* 
 (0.419) 
Log(Sales) 4.210* 
 (2.352) 
Return on assets -0.418*** 
 (0.0784) 
Log(Tangibility) 4.486*** 
 (1.265) 
GDP -1.07e-05 
 (8.68e-06) 
d -0.816 
 (1.409) 
o.treatment - 
  
treatmentxd -0.132 
 (1.331) 
Constant -12.07 
 (33.35) 
  
Company FE YES 
  
Observations 1,162 
Number of companies 116 
R-squared 0.141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Table 27. Difference-in-Difference for Spain and France after matching. This table presents the 
Difference-in-Difference regression, using a sample of 58 matched firms over the period 2008-2014. 
Variable d is the post-reform indicator equal to one after 2011, 2011 included, and zero otherwise. 
Variable treatment is the country estimator equal to one for Spain and zero for France. In this case, 
Stata omits it because of the presence of the company fixed-effects. Variable treatmentxd is the 
treatment-effect indicator, product of the previously mentioned dummy variables. 
Independent   
variables Spain/France 
  
year2009 -0.118 
 (1.205) 
year2010 -0.869 
 (1.051) 
year2012 -0.574 
 (0.930) 
year2013 0.0747 
 (0.985) 
year2014 0.206 
 (1.038) 
Market to book value -0.00250 
 (0.298) 
Log(Sales) 1.921 
 (2.391) 
Return on assets -0.330*** 
 (0.0651) 
Log(Tangibility) 4.418*** 
 (1.663) 
GDP -6.52e-06 
 (2.14e-05) 
d -1.777 
 (1.801) 
o.treatment - 
  
treatmentxd 0.545 
 (2.284) 
Constant 21.61 
 (50.75) 
  
Company FE YES 
  
Observations 714 
R-squared 0.146 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28. Difference-in-Difference for Portugal and The Netherlands after matching. This table 
presents the Difference-in-Difference regression, using a sample of 15 matched firms over the period 
2009-2015. Variable d is the post-reform indicator equal to one after 2012, 2012 included, and zero 
otherwise. Variable treatment is the country estimator equal to one for Portugal and zero for The 
Netherlands. In this case, Stata omits it because of the presence of the company fixed-effects. 
Variable treatmentxd is the treatment-effect indicator, product of the previously mentioned dummy 
variables. 
Independent   
variables Portugal/The Netherlands 
  
year2010 -2.554 
 (1.724) 
year2011 -1.989 
 (2.589) 
year2013 0.428 
 (1.775) 
year2014 -0.633 
 (2.073) 
year2015 -4.423** 
 (1.921) 
Market to book value -0.813 
 (0.846) 
Log(Sales) -0.502 
 (5.234) 
Return on assets -0.206 
 (0.211) 
Log(Tangibility) 6.096 
 (5.399) 
GDP 0.000259* 
 (0.000148) 
d -0.428 
 (3.286) 
o.treatment - 
  
treatmentxd -1.972 
 (2.096) 
Constant -54.84 
 (68.28) 
  
Company FE YES 
  
Observations 194 
R-squared 0.191 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 29. Difference-in-Difference for Brazil and Portugal after matching. This table presents the 
Difference-in-Difference regression, using a sample of 26 matched firms over the period 2002-2008. 
Variable d is the post-reform indicator equal to one after 2005, 2005 included, and zero otherwise. 
Variable treatment is the country estimator equal to one for Brazil and zero for Portugal. In this case, 
Stata omits it because of the presence of the company fixed-effects. Variable treatmentxd is the 
treatment-effect indicator, product of the previously mentioned dummy variables. 
Independent  
variables Brazil/Portugal 
  
year2003 -4.136*** 
 (0.975) 
year2004 -8.513*** 
 (1.844) 
year2006 -2.522* 
 (1.262) 
year2007 -4.866*** 
 (1.184) 
year2008 -2.404 
 (1.724) 
Market to book value 0.435 
 (0.270) 
Log(Sales) 4.011 
 (2.419) 
Return on assets -0.105 
 (0.173) 
Log(Tangibility) 6.863 
 (7.546) 
GDP 1.45e-05* 
 (7.63e-06) 
d -5.698** 
 (2.437) 
o.treatment - 
  
treatmentxd -7.220** 
 (3.090) 
Constant -23.36 
 (33.06) 
  
Company FE YES 
  
Observations 336 
R-squared 0.304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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